Over the past 25 years, safe Conservative seats in the affluent Merseyside suburbs have instead become safe Labour seats. This remarkable political transition poses an important puzzle for students of voting behaviour. Analysis of voting patterns since 1979 underlines the exceptional scale of the shift to Labour on Merseyside compared to other metropolitan areas. Yet, substantial swings to Labour in suburban constituencies like Sefton Central and Wirral South in 2015 and 2017 cannot be explained with reference to wider evidence of the party's increased support among younger, more diverse, cosmopolitan populations. It is shown that Labour dominance on Merseyside has occurred via three distinct phases, with the political map of the city-region turning red, over time, from the core outwards. Explanations rooted in the changing relationship between the city and its suburbs are argued to best explain the emergence of Merseyside as a 'red conurbation'.
Merseyside is both historically and geographically exceptional. In the eight constituencies making up the core of the conurbation, Labour vote shares in 2017 averaged 81 per cent. The four constituencies with the highest Labour vote shares in the country (Liverpool Walton; Knowsley; Liverpool Riverside; Bootle) were all located within this central zone of the Liverpool City-Region and recorded Labour vote shares of 84-86 per cent. Yet, the more remarkable development at recent elections has been the growth of the Labour vote in outer Merseyside. In the seven constituencies beyond the metropolitan core, Labour averaged 58.6 per cent of the vote in 2017, significantly more than its 41 per cent share in Great Britain as a whole. Proximity to Liverpool aside, there is no obvious explanation for the strength of Labour support in these affluent suburban areas. Whether viewed through the lens of 2011 Census data or through the window of a Merseyrail train, constituencies like Sefton Central and Wirral South simply do not look at all like safe Labour seats. As of June 2017, both are just that.
This paper seeks to identify what prompted the Merseyside suburbs to turn, and stay, red when their equivalents elsewhere did not. While it dismisses explanations rooted in notions of Merseyside as a 'red conurbation', the article does argue that the exceptional shift to Labour in the city-region can only be explained with reference to locally-specific factors. These drivers, which have been as much economic and cultural as they have political, also owe a great deal to the role of regeneration policies in bringing about a remarkable reintegration of Liverpool and its suburbs in recent decades.
Red Merseyside and other myths
Sefton Central has a strong claim to be the most unlikely safe Labour seat in Great Britain. Located to the north of Liverpool and primarily comprising the towns of Crosby, Formby and Maghull, it is affluent, settled and suburban in character. Among Great Britain's 633 parliamentary constituencies, it ranks second for home ownership (85.5%), 19 th for the proportion of the population aged 65 and above (24.1%) and 65 th for the proportion of the working-age population employed in higher grade occupations. In almost any other part of the country, this sort of socio-demographic profile would be indicative of a safe Conservative seat. Indeed, of the 25 constituencies in England with the most similar socio-demographic profiles to Sefton Central, 23 were won by the Conservatives in 2017. Yet, Sefton Central has been held by Labour since its creation in 2010 and with a steadily rising vote share. At the 2017 General Election, the Labour incumbent, Bill Esterson, increased his share of the vote to 63 per cent, a majority of 30 points over the second-placed Conservative candidate. Tellingly, Labour's only other two victories in constituencies with similarly high proportions of home-owners, pensioners and managerial-professional workers were in Wirral South and Wirral West, both located just to the south of Liverpool, on the other side of the Mersey. In these seats too, Labour's share of the vote rose in 2017, enabling Alison McGovern to secure an 18 point majority in Wirral South and Margaret Greenwood a 12 point majority in Wirral West. In both cases, these majorities exceeded those achieved by Labour candidates in these seats at the time of Tony Blair's 1997 landslide. 
The making of a metropolitan exception
If Labour's recent performance in outer-Merseyside is not a product of a long local tradition of leftwing politics, is it perhaps a reflection of wider metropolitan trends? Merseyside is, after all, far from alone in witnessing a decline in Conservative Party fortunes and a related rise in support for Labour. The growth of Labour support in big cities and its decline in small towns and rural areas was evident by the early 1980s. 3 Following the 2015 and 2017 elections, this trend has become even more
pronounced, reflecting what Jennings and Stoker see as a growing bifurcation between growing 'cosmopolitan' and declining 'backwater' constituencies. 4 However, at a metropolitan scale, these patterns are less consistent than they are for core cities. The trends shown in Figure 1 inevitably reflect a mix of local and national shifts in support for the political parties. To strip out national influences, Figure 2 shows each party's general election vote share on Merseyside from 1979 to 2017 as a ratio of its national vote share. This graph shows that, in 1979, Labour was already performing better on Merseyside than it was nationally. However, it is equally notable that both Conservative and Liberal vote shares in the conurbation at that time were close to their levels of support nationally. This picture was to change dramatically over the next nine 
Turning red from the inside out
The phases identified above were accompanied by distinct geographical shifts in the balance of Labour and Conservatives support on Merseyside. In 1983 and 1987, Labour's improved performance was concentrated in constituencies at the core of the conurbation. Table 3 ranks the swing over 2 elections from 1979-87 in each Merseyside constituency. In contrast to a 2.4 point swing nationally to the Conservatives over this period, every Merseyside seat saw a swing to Labour. However, the variations in swing were enormous, revealing clear differences between an economically decaying metropolitan core and the still affluent metropolitan suburbs. The biggest swings to Labour were all in Liverpool or Knowsley, districts hit exceptionally hard by job loss during the 1980s. In four of Liverpool's six constituencies, swings of ten points or more to Labour were recorded, with the swing to Labour in the two Knowsley constituencies falling just short of double digits. By contrast, in suburban areas long dominated by the Conservatives, and far less affected by deindustrialisation, the swings to Labour were far more modest. Wirral West, Wirral South and Crosby all remained safe Conservative seats in 1987, while Wallasey was also retained by the Conservatives in the face of a Labour challenge. In Southport, the headline swing was to the Alliance, enabling the Liberal candidate to take the seat in 1987. Yet, support for the Conservatives remained strong here also and the party regained the seat in 1992. How the suburbs were won
The patterns of electoral change outlined above offer important clues as to where explanations for the emergence of Merseyside's red suburbs should focus. As well as accounting for the particularly pronounced shifts to Labour in Merseyside's suburbs in 1997, the more puzzling consolidation of Labour's position in these areas over the subsequent 20 years requires explanation. Moreover, given the observed spatial patterns of political change on Merseyside, there is a need to identify how Labour's earlier consolidation in core inner-urban constituencies was transmitted, centrifugally, to the outer-suburbs. Four potential factors are set out below. In each case, the proximity of these suburban constituencies to Liverpool is of direct importance.
The first factor is psephological and centres on the role of the Liberal Party and its successors in facilitating the long-term movement of support from the Conservatives to Labour. Prior to Blair's repositioning of Labour on the centre-left, many Merseyside suburbanites seeking to vote against the Conservatives had opted for the Liberals, the SDP or the Liberal Democrats. Liverpool had emerged as a key centre of the Liberal Party revival in the 1970s, with the party's dramatic surge in support in the 1973 council election precipitating the decline of the Conservatives in Liverpool. 6 By the early 1980s, the Liberals were consistently ahead of the Conservatives in local elections and by the mid-1980s they had eclipsed the Conservatives as the main party of opposition in the city. Importantly, Liberal success in Liverpool had been built on the local party's development of community-based 'pavement politics'. The accumulated campaigning expertise and capacity greatly assisted the efforts of the Alliance to make in-roads in Merseyside. Other than the 1981 Crosby byelection, the only Alliance victory in outer Merseyside was in Southport in 1987. However, the rise in the third-party vote had the impact of reducing Conservative Party vote shares (but not majorities) and this proved crucial in 1997, when widespread tactical voting took place. Voters who had supported the Alliance in the 1980s had little difficulty switching to New Labour in 1997. The effect was most evident in Crosby, where previous support for the Alliance had been strongest, and the swing to Labour in 1997 was greatest. As Brian Cathcart puts it "Crosby had once, briefly, been an SDP seat for Shirley Williams, but now the well-heeled LibDems of Crosby were voting tactically in their thousands to get the Conservatives out". 7 Such tactical voting is unlikely to have occurred but for the second factor: a shift in how Merseyside suburbanites perceived the city of Liverpool and its politics. To a remarkable degree, political identities in the affluent Merseyside suburbs were underpinned in the 1980s and early 1990s by a concern to disassociate from the economic decline of Liverpool, its related social problems and its descent into political chaos. As Shirley Williams recalls in her memoir, when she arrived in Crosby to fight the November 1981 by-election, she found that:
(...) respectable middle-class families lived behind looped lace curtains in Victorian housesit was as if they were pulling their skirts above their ankles to escape the degradation of a Liverpool that was running down and beset by riots and crime. Liverpool was Labour, had been for decades. That was one reason that Crosby was so Conservative. Beyond Crosby, alongside the wide sandy beaches of the Mersey estuary, were Blundellsands and Formby, desirable places to live. They were occasionally reminded of their great city neighbour by the detritus and lumps of sewage washed up by the tide. 8 By the mid-1990s, the decline of Liverpool had bottomed-out as the regeneration efforts of the previous 15 years began to bear fruit. The structure of the city-region, including the connectivity afforded by its transport infrastructure, has also played a role with respect to the third factor: the cumulative imbalance of campaigning capacity between the Conservative and Labour. The decline of the Conservatives as an electoral force in Liverpool has been so absolute that they have not been represented on the city council since 1998. With no base in local government, the Liverpool Conservatives have shrunk to the point that they rarely campaign actively in more than a single ward. Conservative Associations on the Wirral and in Sefton have also had to contend with falling membership levels and an ageing activist base. By contrast, Labour's increased dominance in Liverpool and Merseyside politics has enabled it to sustain a large local membership and activist base. The enormous contrasts in the capacity of the local parties to engage with the electorate has become increasingly evident. The presence of ultrasafe Labour seats at the core of the city-region, where the largest concentration of its activists is based, has also facilitated the movement of activists out to the suburbs at election time. Labour's scope to deploy large numbers of campaigners in areas such as Wirral West has undoubtedly played a key role in countering the electoral advantages afforded to local Conservative candidates by the strategic channelling of donations to local Conservative Associations. 10 The final factor was a uniquely local source of anti-Tory sentiment, the political impact of which is impossible to quantify, yet obvious to anyone who spends time in the city-region. In April 1989, the Hillsborough disaster resulted in the death of 96 Liverpool supporters attending the FA Cup semifinal. The disturbing chain of events which followed, involving collusion at the highest level between politicians, the police and the media to falsely lay the blame for the disaster with the Liverpool fans, cannot be adequately summarised here. In simple terms, the outcome was that the Conservatives, and particularly Margaret Thatcher, came to be held responsible locally for sanctioning the fabrication of police witness statements and for feeding falsehoods to sections of the Conservativesupporting press. Almost 30 years on, the Sun newspaper, which ran the most notorious front-page story propagating lies about the behaviour of Liverpool supporters, faces a boycott so effective that it is virtually impossible to buy on Merseyside. Importantly, Hillsborough affected the suburbs as much as the city. Many of those who died, and many more who survived but thereafter lived with the trauma of attending the game, came from the outer boroughs. Hillsborough connected the city to the suburbs emotionally, via family and friendship networks, and though the fundamental significance of football to the cultural life of Merseyside. The siting of Hillsborough memorials outside Crosby library and at Port Sunlight on the Wirral are testament to how the impact of the disaster reached directly, and indefinitely, into the Conservative suburbs.
This paper has sought to explain the exceptional case of Merseyside's red suburbs. As a case study of outliers, in both a geographical and psephological sense, it is instructive in several ways. There is growing evidence that place matters to political preferences. Despite past scepticism, the possibility of neighbourhood effects on voting behaviour, centred on the proposition that 'people to who talk together, vote together', is being revisited. 11 To date, discussion has mostly centred on the polarisation between big cities and university towns, on one hand, and smaller towns locked into long-term decline, on the other. The dynamics of political change in the suburbs has received far less attention, partly because of the long-standing assumption that suburbanisation fosters conservative bias. 12 Yet, the Merseyside case suggests that suburbs do not automatically tack to the right politically and that specifically local factors, including shifts in the relationship between cities and suburbs, can radically alter the politics of the latter. The time may be ripe to pay more attention to what we can learn from the outliers.
